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1. Introduction 
The recent European sovereign debt crisis has spurred academics and policy makers to try 
to identify the drivers of sovereign risk, in order to be able to react to similar challenges in 
the future. Figure 1 shows that from the start of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) and before the financial crisis, spreads on 10-year sovereign bond yields 
relative to the German benchmark moved in a narrow range with only very slight 
differences across countries. Nevertheless, with the financial crisis the picture changed 
completely; after the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in late 2009, sovereign risk 
differentials rose sharply and then continued to fluctuate strongly. Indeed, the financial 
crisis put the spotlight on the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within EMU countries 
which had largely been ignored during the period of stability1 when the markets had 
seemed to underestimate the possibility that governments might default.  
 
These events raised some important questions for economists. What explains the 
disparities and the shift in the pricing of sovereign debt risk during the crisis period? Have 
the drivers of yield spreads and their relevance changed since the crisis? Are there 
important differences between peripheral and central countries?  
 
Euro area sovereign bond markets initially attracted attention from academia as a way to 
assess the impact of the EMU on the process of financial integration [see Codogno et al. 
(2003), Baele et al. (2004), or Gómez-Puig (2006 and 2008), to name a few]. In these first 
studies, the standard definition of sovereign risk included its two main domestic 
components, market liquidity and credit risk, and an international risk factor which 
reflected investors‟ risk aversion. Some of the research then focused on the analysis of the 
relative importance of systemic versus idiosyncratic risk factors in explaining yield spreads in 
Europe after the introduction of the common currency, even though the empirical 
evidence was not conclusive. Several studies [Geyer et al. (2004) and Pagano and Von 
Thadden (2004), among others] stressed the importance of systemic risk in the behaviour 
of yield differentials in EMU countries, while others showed that the idiosyncratic risk 
component in the movements of spreads was greater than the systemic risk [e.g., Goméz-
Puig (2009), Dötz and Fischer (2010) and Favero and Missale (2012)]. All in all, studies 
whose data end before the global financial crisis coincided in stating that euro area bond 
markets shared a high degree of financial integration (see, e.g., Abad et al., 2010). 
                                                          
1Kocenda et al. (2008) empirically examine the fiscal convergence of the European Union members and their results 
suggest that monetary unions do not necessarily encourage fiscal convergence for its members. 
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However, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe which began in late 2009 has revived the 
literature on euro area sovereign spread drivers and has attributed increasing importance to 
uncertainty and variables reflecting investment confidence conditions and perceptions for 
the upcoming economic activity (see, e.g. Georgoutsos and Migiakis, 2013). In this regard, 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014a)2 point out that a crisis in one country may give a 
“wake-up call” to international investors to reassess the risks in other countries; since 
uninformed or less informed investors that may have difficulty in extracting the signals 
from the falling prices, in following the strategies of better informed investors, may 
generate excess co-movements across the markets3. Likewise, Favero and Missale (2012) 
find that the credit risk component has increased in importance as a determinant of 
sovereign bond spreads because of the adverse market sentiment conditions after the 
global financial crisis. Similar arguments can be found in other recent studies using data 
that extend beyond the crisis period [see, among others, Palladini and Portes (2011), Beirne 
and Fratzscher (2013) or Aizenman et al., (2013)]. Besides, many authors have stressed the 
importance of other fundamental variables beyond the country‟s fiscal position to explain 
yield spread behaviour after the outbreak of the crisis [Mody (2009), Barrios et al. (2009), 
the IMF (2010), Bolton and Jeanne (2011), Allen et al. (2011) and Acharya et al. (2014), to 
name a few]. In addition, comparing these findings to the ones with data samples ending 
before the crisis period provides evidence of potential in-sample changes in the 
specification of the spreads. For instance, several studies have highlighted other 
determinants, such as the dynamic properties of sovereign spreads over time [see, e.g., 
Pozzi and Wolswijk (2008), Gerlach et al. (2010), Aβmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012) and 
Bernoth and Erdogan (2012)]. 
 
In this framework, the contribution of this paper to the existing literature is threefold. The 
first is methodological: we adopt an eclectic approach, using a general-to-specific modelling 
strategy with panel data techniques, to empirically assess the relevance of the variables that 
have been proposed in the recent theoretical and empirical literature as potential drivers of 
EMU sovereign bond yield spreads. We provide an updated review of the literature on the 
determinants of sovereign bond spreads and compile a comprehensive data base (see 
                                                          
2In this paper, the authors analyse contagion using an approach that is based on the channels of transmission that are 
used to spread the effects of the crisis [(Masson, 1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) among others]. Specifically, 
they examine whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to “fundamentals-
based” or “pure contagion”. Their results suggest the importance of both variables proxying market sentiment and 
macrofundamentals in determining contagion and underline the coexistence of “pure contagion” and “fundamentals-
based contagion” during the recent European debt crisis.    
3 The degree of non-anticipation of a crisis by investors or sudden shifts in market confidence and expectations have been 
identified as important factors causing “pure contagion” (see Masson, 1999 and Mondria and Quintana-Domeque, 2013).  
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Section 3) with potential drivers including not only variables that measure macroeconomic 
fundamentals (at both local and regional level) and banking linkages, but also those that 
capture changes in market sentiment: either idiosyncratic, regional or global. To our 
knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the variables 
used in the literature to examine sovereign yield spread behaviour and, in particular, to 
gauge the effect on yield spreads of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion, whose 
importance has been particularly stressed by the literature since the outbreak of the recent 
debt crisis. The second contribution has to do with the political relevance of the sample 
examined, i.e. both central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and The Netherlands)4 and 
peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries from January 1999 to 
December 2012. This focus allows us to disentangle possible differences in the behaviour 
between these two groups of countries within the EMU. Lastly, following the literature that 
re-emerged with the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the third contribution is the analysis of 
the time-varying pricing differences of the same spread drivers by market participants since 
the crisis outbreak. As explained above, in recent years, many authors have applied a variety 
of methodologies to focus on this topic [Gerlach et al. (2010), Bernoth and Erdogan (2012) 
or Georgoutsos and Migiakis (2013) to name a few]. So, this paper aims to present an 
updated analysis of sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The econometric methodology is explained in 
Section 2. The dataset used to analyse sovereign spreads determinants is described in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical findings, whilst Section 5 offers some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Econometric Methodology 
As mentioned in the Introduction, we adopt an eclectic approach and apply a general-to-
specific modelling strategy to empirically evaluate the relevance of the highest number of 
variables that have been proposed in the recent theoretical and empirical literature as 
potential drivers of EMU sovereign bond yield spreads. To this end, a general unrestricted 
model is formulated to provide a consistent approximation to the “local” data generation 
process (namely, the joint distribution of the subset of variables under analysis), given the 
previous theoretical and empirical background. The empirical analysis commences from 
this general specification and is then tested for mis-specifications; if none are apparent, it is 
                                                          
4 This classification between EMU central and peripheral countries follows the standard division presented in the 
literature.  
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simplified to a parsimonious, consistent representation, each simplification step being 
checked by diagnostic testing. 
 
Given the relatively short sample available since the introduction of the euro in 1999, we 
use panel data econometrics to combine the power of cross section averaging with all the 
subtleties of temporal dependence (see Baltagi, 2008). An analysis of the advantages and 
limitations of using panel data sets is presented by Hsiao (2003). The main advantages over 
single cross-sections or time series data are the following: a) more accurate inference of 
model parameters, b) greater capacity for capturing the complexity of economic 
relationships, c) more informative results, d) more ability to control for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity, and e) its simpler computation and statistical inference. Indeed, 
this methodology has already been used in the literature to examine EMU sovereign spread 
determinants [see, e.g. Schuknecht et al. (2009), Von Hagen et al. (2011) or Gómez-Puig 
(2006 and 2008)].   
 
Our data set consists of a large number of variables that are observed in a sequence of 
successive moments in time forming a data panel.  
 
3. Data 
The dependent variables in our empirical analysis are bond yield spreads, derived as 
differences between 10-year sovereign bond yields of EMU-founding countries along with 
Greece and yields of the equivalent German bund. Therefore, our sample contains both 
central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands) and peripheral EMU 
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain)5.  
 
We use monthly data from January 1999 to December 2012 collected from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. Figure 1 plots the evolution of daily 10-year sovereign bond spreads 
for each country in our sample. A simple look at this figure indicates the differences in the 
yield behaviour before and after the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis at the end 
of 2009.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
                                                          
5 Luxembourg is excluded from the present analysis, because of its very low level of outstanding amount of sovereign 
bonds. 
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Specifically, it is striking that between the introduction of the euro in January 1999 and 
November 2009, when it became clear that the Greek economy was unable to finance its 
sovereign debt, spreads on bonds of EMU countries moved in a narrow range with only 
slight differentiation across countries. In fact, the stability and convergence of spreads was 
considered a hallmark of successful financial integration (see, e.g. Abad et. al., 2010) inside 
the euro area (neither the subprime crisis nor the collapse of Lehman Brothers bit 
significantly into euro sovereign spreads). 
 
Nevertheless, once the global financial crisis began to affect the real sector, the imbalances 
within euro area countries were plain to see. Spreads, which had reached levels close to 
zero between the launch of the euro and October 2009 (the average value of the 10-year 
yield spread against the German bund moved between 10 and 47 basis points in the cases 
of France and Greece respectively), have risen ever since. Indeed, the risk premium on 
EMU government bonds increased strongly from November 2009, reflecting investor 
perceptions of upcoming risks. Figure 1 shows that by late 2011 and early 2012 it reached 
maximum levels of 4680 basis points in Greece, 1141 in Portugal, 1125 in Ireland, 635 in 
Spain and 550 in Italy. This widespread increase in sovereign spreads meant that certain 
euro area Member States were under enormous pressure to finance their debt, and funding 
costs rose significantly; this led to an increase in rollover risk as debt had to be refinanced 
at unusually high costs and, in extreme cases, could not be rolled over at all, triggering the 
need for a rescue (see Caceres et. al., 2010). 
 
With regard to the independent variables, as explained in the Introduction, we include 
variables that measure macroeconomic fundamentals beyond the country‟s fiscal position 
(at both the local and regional level), some potential financial channels of crisis 
transmission, and variables that may capture changes in market sentiment: either 
idiosyncratic, regional or global. A summary with the definitions and sources of all the 
explanatory variables used in the panel models is presented in Appendix A. All the 
variables included in the estimation that capture both macroeconomic fundamentals or 
financial linkages are in relative terms to the German ones, as our dependent variable is the 
difference between the 10-year sovereign yield of each country over Germany. 
 
Specifically, according to Dornbusch et al. (2000), reasons that may explain the evolution of 
sovereign yields spreads can be divided into two groups: fundamentals-based reasons on 
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the one hand, and investor behaviour-based reasons on the other. While the former works 
through real and financial linkages across countries, the latter is more sentiment-driven. 
Following the literature, in order to measure the impact of fundamental variables (at both 
local and regional level) on sovereign spread behaviour, we use instruments that gauge not 
only each country‟s fiscal position, but the market liquidity in each country, its foreign debt, 
its potential rate of growth, and the loss of competitiveness as well. The private sector level 
of indebtedness has been added in the analysis of the effect of local fundamental variables 
and, finally, we have included foreign claims on sectoral private debt and cross-border 
banking system linkages as measures of the degree of crisis transmission through the 
financial system (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013).  
 
In particular, the variables used to measure the country‟s fiscal position are the government 
debt-to-GDP and the government deficit-to-GDP. These two variables have been widely 
used in the literature by other authors (see, e.g., Bayoumi et al., 1995) and present an 
advantage over credit rating in that they cannot be considered ex post measures of fiscal 
sustainability. Since they are measures of credit risk, they should be directly related with 
sovereign spreads increase.  
 
Regarding the liquidity premium in each sovereign debt market, empirical papers examining 
the influence of market liquidity in bond markets use a variety of measures to gauge its 
three main dimensions of tightness, depth and resiliency6. However, since several studies 
have shown that all liquidity measures are closely related to each other, we chose the overall 
outstanding volume of sovereign debt7 as a proxy of liquidity differences between markets. 
Since liquidity premium decreases with market size, we would expect this variable to have a 
negative effect on sovereign spreads. 
 
Besides, the current-account-balance-to-GDP ratio is the instrument used as a proxy of the 
foreign debt and the net position of the country vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Note that 
this variable is defined as the difference between exports and imports. Therefore, an 
increase would signal an improvement in the net position of the country towards the rest 
of the world, reducing sovereign spreads. The importance of this variable has been 
                                                          
6 These measures include trading volume, bid-ask spreads, the outstanding amount of debt securities, and the issue size of 
the specific bond. Many authors [Gómez-Puig (2006), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), and Gerlach et al. (2010), to name a 
few], have presented empirical evidence which supports the high linkages between all liquidity measures. 
7 It is considered a measure of market depth because larger markets may present lower information costs as their 
securities are likely to trade frequently, and a relatively large number of investors may own or may have analysed their 
features 
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underlined by the IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. (2009). In view of Mody (2009)‟s argument 
that countries‟ sensitivity to the financial crisis is more pronounced the greater the loss of 
their growth potential and competitiveness, we include instruments that measure these 
features. The unemployment rate is the variable used to capture the country‟s growth 
potential, whilst the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices monthly interannual rate of 
growth is the inflation rate measure that we use as a proxy of the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and, thus, the country‟s loss of competitiveness. An increase in either 
unemployment or inflation represents a deterioration of growth potential and 
competitiveness; therefore, it should augment sovereign spreads.   
 
To assess the role of private debt in the euro area sovereign debt crisis, we also incorporate 
instruments that capture the level of indebtedness of each country‟s private sector in the 
analysis. 8 To this end, we make use of a single dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector in 
each EMU country. In particular, we apply three variables: banks‟ debt-to-GDP, non-
financial corporations‟ debt-to-GDP, and households‟ debt-to-GDP, constructed with data 
obtained from the European Central Bank Statistics. Since high leverage levels in the 
private sector have a negative impact on the public sector‟s sustainability, an increase in 
these three variables would positively affect sovereign yield spreads9.   
Finally, according to certain authors [Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen et al. (2011), 
among them], in a scenario of increased international financial activity in the euro area, not 
only are public finance imbalances key determinants of the probability that the sovereign 
debt crisis could spill over from one country to another, but the transmission of the crisis 
through the banking system may also be a major issue. As a result, in our analysis we also 
include variables that capture the important cross-border banking system linkages in euro 
area countries. These linkages are measured using the consolidated claims on an immediate 
borrower basis of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks in the public, 
banking and non-financial private sectors as a proportion of GDP. Moreover, we also 
explore the role of consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis, provided by BIS 
by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each country. 
                                                          
8 The interconnection between private and public debt and thus, between banking and sovereign crises is obvious. 
However, whether it was private debt which ultimately bankrupted sovereigns or if, conversely, excessive public debt 
undermined the banking sector is a question that is not easily answered.  Indeed, the main causes of the debt crises in 
Europe vary according to the country. In some countries, the public sector was overwhelmed by the costs of cleaning up 
the banking system and forced to seek bail-outs (Ireland and Spain); whilst in others, the main source of vulnerability was 
certainly concentrated on the public sector balance sheet itself (Greece, Portugal and Italy, for instance).  
9 The recent literature has focused on the interdependencies that exist between the banking and the sovereign sector [see 
Brunnemeier et al. (2011), Reichlin (2013)].   
 
 9 
We expect that higher banking sector exposure and cross-border banking system linkages 
will be associated with an increase in sovereign spreads10.  
 
Four variables have been used to gauge the effect of regional, global or local market 
sentiment in each different country over sovereign spreads: stock returns, stock volatility, 
an index of economic policy uncertainty, and an index of the fiscal stance.  
 
Monthly stock returns are used in order to reflect portfolio allocation effects between 
stocks and bonds in each country (see, among others, Aizenman et al., 2013 and 
Georgoutsos and Migiakis, 2013). Since periods of financial turmoil and negative stock 
returns may be accompanied by rises in sovereign bond spreads because of an increased 
propensity to hold safer assets (the German bund in our case), we expect a negative 
association between them. To this end, differences in logged stock index prices of the last 
and the first day of the month have been calculated for the benchmark stock index in each 
country; whilst the Eurostoxx-50 and the Standard and Poor‟s 500 have been used to 
calculate the evolution of regional and global stock returns respectively. Volatility is a 
measure of the level of uncertainty prevailing in stock markets11. In this paper implied 
volatility has been used to gauge both regional and global stock market volatility. In 
particular, the variables VSTOXX and VIX, which measure implied volatility in Eurostoxx-
50 and Standard and Poor‟s 500 index options and have been widely used in the literature 
by other authors (see, e.g., Afonso, 2012, Aizenman et al., 2013, and Battistini et al., 2013) as 
measures of uncertainty in the Eurozone and the global financial markets respectively. 
However, since implied volatility indices were not available for all countries, we opted for 
the monthly standard deviation of equity returns in each country to capture local stock 
market volatility. The increased stock market volatility is usually accompanied by an 
increase in other risk components and, thus, leads to increases in bond yield spreads; as a 
result, we expect a positive sign for the respective coefficient.  
Some authors (see, e.g. Ades and Chua, 1993) find that political instability has strong 
negative effects on a country‟s per capita growth rate. Thus, to assess whether policy 
uncertainty has an influence on the decisions of bond market investors, we have used the 
index of economic policy uncertainty (EPU), built by Baker et al. (2013), which draws on 
                                                          
10 The construction and evolution of sectoral private debt, foreign banks claims by sector and by nationality of reporting 
banks are explained in Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013). 
11 Two different approaches are used to estimate it; while historical volatility involves measuring the standard deviation of 
closing returns for any particular security over a given period of time, implied volatility is derived from option prices. The 
latter represents the estimates and assumptions of market participants involved in a trade, on the basis of a given option 
price, and has been used to gauge both regional and global stock market volatility 
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the frequency of newspaper references to policy uncertainty and other indicators and is 
available for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Europe and the United States. A positive sign 
is also expected for the respective coefficient since policy uncertainty may discourage 
investments in sovereign debt markets. A related question is the analysis of the impact of 
the fiscal stance of each country on sovereign debt spreads. Therefore, the index of the 
fiscal stance suggested by Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012) is also included in the analysis. 
Unlike the standard econometric tests of fiscal sustainability, this index is suitable for 
assessing fiscal policy in the short and medium term as it can measure the fiscal 
consolidation needed to achieve a pre-specified debt target at any future time horizon. To 
capture regional and global risk we have used the European and United States indices of 
fiscal stance respectively. Since by construction the higher the index; the worse the fiscal 
stance, we expect a positive sign for its coefficient.  
 
Another variable, the consumer confidence indicator12, has been used to measure either 
regional (Eurozone) or local market sentiment in each different country. This index is used 
to gauge economic agents‟ perceptions of future economic activity. It seems reasonable to 
expect a negative relationship between it and spreads, since an increase in consumer 
confidence may lead to a rise in investor confidence in the economy‟s potential for growth.  
Finally, the analysis of the influence of local, regional and global market sentiment on 
sovereign yield spreads has been completed by the inclusion of one more variable in the 
first case, five additional variables in the second, and two supplementary variables in the 
third.  
 
The credit rating has been included as a proxy of the market perception of default risk in 
each local market13. The five variables that have been added to explore the impact of 
regional market sentiment on sovereign spreads are the following. Firstly, following 
Georgoutsos and Migiakis (2013), two variables have been included in order to account for 
the effects of the prevailing credit risk conditions in the European corporate bond market 
                                                          
12 According to some authors (see, e.g., Rua, 2002), the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) has informative content for 
the GDP growth rate and can therefore be used to gauge economic agents‟ perceptions of future economic activity. 
However, since this indicator was not available for Ireland, and the correlation between the Consumer Confidence 
Indicator (CCI) and the ESI is very high, we decided to include the CCI in the analysis.  
13 Following Blanco (2001), we built a monthly scale to estimate the effect of investor sentiment based on the rating 
offered by the three most important agencies (Standard &Poor‟s, Moody‟s and Fitch). Since this variable is considered an 
ex post measure of fiscal sustainability it should have a positive impact on sovereign spreads (by construction, the higher 
the scale; the worse the rating categories). 
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(EuroCSPREAD, EuroITRAXX –both in the financial and in the non-financial sector-).14 
Considering the „„safe haven‟‟ status of the German bund, we expect these two variables, 
which measure credit risk in the corporate bond market, to be positively related to the 
spreads. Secondly, one- and ten-year interest rate volatility indices for the Eurozone 
(EIRVIXs)15 have also been incorporated in the analysis. A positive sign is also expected 
for these variables, since increased interest rate volatility is usually accompanied by an 
increase in yield spread volatility. Finally, to account for the concerns for the stability of the 
euro two variables have been used: (1) The indicator built by Klose and Weigert (2014) 
which reflects the market expectation of the probability that at least one euro area country 
will have left the currency union by the end of 2013; and (2) The time-varying probability 
of two or more credit events (out of ten) over a one-year horizon calculated by Lucas et al. 
(2013) which measures the joint default risk in the euro area. A positive relationship is also 
expected between the last two variables (which measure uncertainty and default risk in the 
euro area) and sovereign yield spreads.  
 
As mentioned, two supplementary variables have also been introduced in the model in 
order to assess global market risk aversion. First, the Kansas City Financial Stress Index 
built by Hakkio and Keeton (2009) has been included in the analysis16 and, finally, 
following the empirical literature on sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets, which 
shows that yields on US government bonds are the main determinants of sovereign 
spreads, the spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on 10-
year Moody‟s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds is also introduced as a proxy of 
international risk factors (see Codogno et al., 2003 and Gómez-Puig, 2008). A positive 
relationship is also expected between these two variables and sovereign spreads. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
As mentioned before, our empirical analysis starts with a general unrestricted statistical 
model including all explanatory variables to capture the essential characteristics of the 
underlying dataset, using standard testing procedures to reduce its complexity by 
                                                          
14 The first variable displays the spread between the yields of European corporate bonds iBoxx indices with a rating of 
BBB, whilst the other two are European 5-year CDS indices in the financial and the non-financial sector respectively (the 
corresponding indices for the United States have been widely used in the literature: see, for instance, Gilchrist et. al., 
2013). 
15 They are based on the implied volatility quotes of caps (floors) – one of the most liquid interest rate derivatives– and 
constructed by López and Navarro (2013)  
16 This is a monthly measure of stress in the US financial system based on 11 financial market variables (a positive value 
indicates that financial stress is above the long-run average, while a negative value signifies that financial stress is below 
the long-run average). 
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eliminating statistically insignificant variables, and checking the validity of the reductions at 
each stage in order to ensure congruence of the finally selected model in order to find what 
variables explain developments best. 
 
Tables 1 to 3 show the final results for three groups of countries: all EMU countries, EMU 
central countries, and EMU peripheral countries during the whole sample period: 1999:01-
2012:12. . The reason for these three groups is that, based on a country-by-country analysis, 
we conclude that the EMU countries under study are not homogeneous, detecting two 
categories within them and allowing for differentiation in the impact of potential 
determinants on bond spreads in core and peripheral countries17. We report the results 
obtained using the Fixed Effects (FE) model since it is the relevant one in all cases18.   
[Insert Tables 1 to 3 here] 
The first column in these tables do not take into account the dynamic properties of 
sovereign spreads drivers over time; they show the results for the whole period (pre-crisis 
and crisis) in order to select the best model to be used in the rest of the analysis after 
having eliminated statistically insignificant variables. Nevertheless, some conclusions 
regarding the different sovereign yield spreads drivers in EMU countries are worth noting.  
Concretely, Table 1 shows that the increase in the sovereign risk premium in the euro area 
during the European sovereign crisis cannot be attributed solely to deteriorating 
macroeconomic fundamentals in member countries, or to herding behaviour or sudden 
shifts in market confidence and expectations, but to both types of drivers. These findings 
are consistent with those reported by Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014a) or Dungey 
and Gajurel (2013) who support the idea that (since they are not mutually exclusive), a 
                                                          
17  The results of this sensitivity analysis to the exclusion of each country one at a time and to the elimination of the 
peripheral and core countries are not shown here, but are available from the authors upon request. It is interesting to note 
that these two groups roughly correspond to those found in Jacquemin and Sapir (1996), applying principal component 
and cluster analyses to a wide set of structural and macroeconomic indicators, to form a homogeneous group of 
countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same identified by European Commission (1995) when making a 
distinction within countries whose currencies continuously participated in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its 
inception. Two groups of countries were differentiated: those that maintained broadly stable bilateral exchange rates 
against the Deutschmark, and those whose currencies either entered the ERM later or suspended its participation in the 
ERM, fluctuating in value to a great extent relative to the Deutschmark. Finally, the same two groups are found in 
Fernández-Rodríguez et al. (1999) to have relevant information helping to improve the prediction of currencies in each 
group based on the behaviour of the rest of the currencies, information that can be used to generate simple trading rules 
that outperform the moving average trading rules widely used in the markets (see Fernández-Rodríguez et al.., 2003).  
18  We consider three basic panel regression methods: the fixed-effects (FE) method, the random effects (RE) model and 
the pooled-OLS method. In order to determine the empirical relevance of each of the potential methods for our panel 
data, we make use of several statistic tests. In particular, we test FE versus RE using the Hausman test statistic to test for 
non-correlation between the unobserved effect and the regressors. To choose between pooled-OLS and RE, we use 
Breusch and Pagan (1980)‟s Lagrange multiplier test to test for the presence of an unobserved effect. Finally, we use the F 
test for fixed effects to test whether all unobservable individual effects are zero, in order to discriminate between pooled-
OLS and RE. To save space, we do not show here these tests. They are available from the authors upon request. 
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mixture of “fundamental-based” and “pure contagion” might have taken place in the 
Eurozone. Indeed, recent European events have encouraged a new discussion, since unlike 
previous crises in which the country responsible for spreading the shock was relatively 
clear; in the euro area sovereign debt crisis several peripheral countries entered a fiscal crisis 
at roughly the same time. Actually, when a group of countries share an exchange rate 
agreement (a common currency in the case of the euro area countries), crises tend to be 
clustered. In this scenario, it seems reasonable that, since the economic fundamentals of 
EMU countries are interconnected by their cross-border flows of goods, services, and 
capital, other variables beyond herding behaviour or sudden shifts in market confidence 
might also be at the origin of crisis propagation. 
However, some differences between spreads‟ drivers in central and peripheral countries are 
worth noting. Specifically, whilst variables gauging regional macrofundamentals are more 
significant in central countries (Table 2) than in peripheral ones, local macrofundamentals 
are more relevant in explaining peripheral yields spreads than those of central countries 
(Table 3). Besides, whilst foreign banks‟ claims on the private (non-financial) sector are 
significant in the two groups of countries, foreign claims on the banking and public sectors 
are only significant in one group of countries: in central and peripheral countries 
respectively (see Tables 2 and 3). These results are in line with the recent literature which 
outlines that, in an scenario of increased international financial activity in the euro area19, 
not only public finances imbalances are key determinants of the probability that the 
sovereign debt crisis could spill over from one country to another, but that transmission of 
the crisis through the banking system may have also been a major issue [see Bolton and 
Jeanne (2011) or Allen et al. (2011), among others]. Moreover, Table 3 shows that the level 
of indebtedness in the banking sector is also significant driver of sovereign risk premium in 
peripheral countries which highlights the interconnection between private and public debt  
(see Acharya et al., 2014)20 and thus, between banking and sovereign crises in southern 
countries.  
 
                                                          
19 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 through the Second Banking Directive was a decisive step towards a unified 
European financial market, which subsequently led to a convergence in financial legislation and regulation across member countries. 
20 These authors have recently used the term „„two-way feedback‟‟ to describe them. According to these authors, a 
systemic banking crisis can induce a contraction of the entire economy, which will weaken public finances and transfer 
the distress to the government. This contagion effect is amplified when state guarantees exist for the financial sector. As a 
feedback effect, risk is further transmitted to holders of sovereign debt. An increase in the cost of sovereign debt will lead 
to a devaluation of government debt, which will impair the balance sheets of banks holding these assets.  
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Furthermore, as it has been noted before, Table 2 shows that the rise in sovereign risk in 
central countries, triggered by the behaviour of peripheral countries, can only partially be 
explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries (the two 
domestic components of sovereign risk included in its standard definition, market liquidity 
and credit risk, are the only ones that turn out to be significant). Conversely, it may be 
more related not only to regional macroeconomic fundamentals behaviour but also to local 
as much as regional and global market sentiment variables which reflect investors‟ risk 
aversion; since in times of uncertainty, they become more risk averse and the “flight-to-
safety” motive favours bonds of countries that are generally regarded to have a low default 
risk (e.g., during the crisis Germany experienced one of its lowest yield levels in history). 
Indeed, 10-year yields spreads over Germany of Austrian, Finnish, French and Dutch 
government bonds achieved maximum levels of 183, 83, 189 and 84 basis points (in 
November 2011 in the first three countries and in April 2012 in the case of the 
Netherlands, see Figure 1) while the credit rating provided by the three most important 
agencies (Moody‟s, Standard & Poor‟s and Fitch) at the same date was, as in Germany, the 
highest.  
 
Nevertheless, since one of the objectives of this paper is to examine whether investors may 
have ignored cross country differences or changes in country-specific fundamentals during 
the stability period and may have reacted much more strongly during the crisis, we  analyse 
the differences of coefficients‟ significance over time (i.e., during the pre-crisis and the 
crisis period). The breakpoint date has been fixed at the end of November 2009. Gómez-
Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014b), applying both the Quandt-Andrews and the Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003) tests and letting the data select when regime shifts occurred, showed 
that around two thirds of the breakpoints they examine21 (i.e., 63%) occurred after 
November 2009, when Papandreou‟s government disclosed that its finances were far worse 
than previously announced22. This marked the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt 
crisis and the onset of financial instability and risk propagation among EMU countries (see, 
e. g., Agarwal et al., 2013, and Yang et al., 2014).  
 
Therefore, in addition to the independent variables explained in Section 3, in order to 
estimate potential changes in the marginal effects after the crisis, a dummy (DPRE) which 
                                                          
21In this paper, the authors explore changes in the existence and direction of causality by means of a Granger-causality 
approach before and after endogenously (data-based) identified crises during the period January 1999-December 2012. 
22 This announcement worsened the severe crisis in the Greek economy, and the country‟s debt rating was lowered to 
BBB+ (the lowest in the euro zone) on December 8th.  
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takes the value 1 in the pre-crisis period (and 0, otherwise) is also introduced in the 
estimations and the coefficients of the interactions between this dummy and the rest of 
variables are calculated (see Gómez-Puig, 2006 and 2008). Thus, the marginal effects of 
each variable are: 
 
β  = β1 + β2DPRE 
 
We honestly think that a formal coefficient test H0: β1  = β1 + β2, in order to assess whether 
the impact of independent variables on the bond yield spreads changed significantly with 
the start of the sovereign debt crisis, is not necessary as long as β2 is significant. So, the 
marginal coefficients of a variable are: 
   
β  = β1  (in the crisis period) 
β  = β1 + β2 (in the pre-crisis period) 
 
The second column in Tables 1 to 3 shows the FE re-estimation results with the DPRE 
dummy. As can be seen, in all cases the marginal effects increase in the crisis period (β1) 
compared to the pre-crisis period (β1 + β2). Therefore, these results are in line with previous 
studies that point out the dynamic properties of sovereign spreads drivers over time after 
the start of the crisis [see, e.g., Pozzi and Wolswijk (2008), Gerlach et al. (2010), Aβmann 
and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012) and Bernoth and Erdogan (2012)] or which show an increase 
in the sensitivity of the price of risk to fundamentals during the euro area debt crisis 
compared with the pre-crisis period (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013, among them). Not 
only do all the variables that capture both local and regional fundamentals or market 
sentiment increase their significance in the two groups of countries in the crisis period 
compared to the pre-crisis one, but the variable that gauges global market sentiment also 
increases its significance after the start of the crisis in both central and peripheral EMU 
countries, confirming the increased importance of investors‟ risk aversion suggested by the 
literature [see Codogno et al. (2003), Sgherri and Zoli (2009) or Bernoth and Erdogan 
(2012), among them] in times of uncertainty.  
 
To further investigate the possibility of differences in spread behaviour before and after the 
crisis period, we once again apply the general-to-specific approach, commencing from a 
general congruent speciﬁcation that is simpliﬁed to a minimal representation consistent 
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with the data evidence. The general-to-specific reduction process ensures that the final and 
reduced model conveys all the information embodied in the unrestricted and general one, 
and opens up the possibility of identifying different explanatory variables for the different 
subsamples we are examining (whole period, pre-crisis, and crisis period) in the diverse 
groups of countries (all countries, central, and peripheral countries), since it produces 
empirical models that are data-coherent. Results are presented in Tables 4 to 6 also, whose 
first column also reports the original FE estimation results (first column of Tables 1 to 3) 
for the whole sample period. 
[Insert Tables 4 to 6 here] 
The dynamic properties of sovereign yield spreads drivers over time after the start of the 
crisis are reaffirmed by the findings that can be drawn from Tables 4 to 6. Concretely, 
when analysing Table 4, which corresponds to all the countries, it is notable that the price 
of risk is much more sensitive to both local and regional variables (those that capture 
market sentiment as much as those that gauge macroeconomic fundamentals) in the crisis 
than in the pre-crisis period. These results suggest, on the one hand, that some important 
macroeconomic imbalances apart from the fiscal position (e.g. the non-financial 
corporations‟ level of indebtedness) had been largely ignored during the period of stability 
when markets seemed to underestimate the possibility that governments might default; and, 
on the other, they suggest that an important increase in the relevance of uncertainty and of 
variables reflecting investors‟ risk aversion is observed after the global financial crisis (six 
variables measuring regional market sentiment and one variable measuring local market 
sentiment were only significant in the crisis period) as pointed out by many authors [see, 
e.g. Favero and Missale (2012) or Georgoutsos and Migiakis (2013)]. 
 
Furthermore, Tables 5 and 6, which display the results in the three periods for central and 
peripheral EMU countries, show that the increase in the sensitivity of sovereign yield 
spreads to market sentiment and macroeconomic fundamental variables with the crisis has 
been much higher in peripheral (Table 6) than in central countries (Table 5). 
  
Specifically, whilst Table 5 shows that in central EMU countries some variables which 
measure local market sentiment (in the case of the rating) or local macroeconomic 
fundamentals (the current account balance and the unemployment rate) only become 
significant with the crisis, Table 6 shows that, in peripheral EMU countries, five new 
variables are significant after the start of the crisis. One of them measures local market 
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sentiment (stock volatility), two others gauge local macroeconomic imbalances (the 
unemployment rate and the level of indebtedness in the banking sector), and the last two 
are proxies of the linkages across the financial system (foreign banks‟ claims on public and 
private non-financial sector). 
Again, it is noticeable that the variables measuring global market sentiment and investors‟ 
global risk aversion, which are significant in both periods, register a rise in their marginal 
effects after the start of the sovereign crisis, particularly in EMU peripheral countries 
(Table 6). This finding, which suggests that sovereign risk pricing is also related to herding 
behaviour of investors and other cases of extreme market sentiment, is consistent with Lux 
(1995) or Akerlof and Shiller (2009). 
5. Concluding remarks 
The sovereign debt crisis in Europe which began in late 2009 has revived the literature on 
euro area sovereign spread drivers and has highlighted the importance of uncertainty and 
variables reflecting investment confidence conditions and perceptions for the upcoming 
economic activity. This situation raises some important questions for economists. What can 
explain the disparities and the shift in the pricing of sovereign debt risk during the crisis 
period? Have the drivers of yield spreads and their relevance changed since the crisis? Are 
there important differences among peripheral and central countries?  
 
The main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is methodological. We adopt 
an eclectic approach, using a general-to-specific modelling strategy with panel data 
techniques, to empirically assess the relevance of the highest number of variables proposed 
in the recent theoretical and empirical literature as potential drivers of EMU sovereign 
bond yield spreads, allowing the data to identify those variables that explain developments 
best for each of the three EMU groups of countries considered. 
 
To our knowledge, this paper presents one of the most exhaustive compilations of the 
variables used in the literature to examine sovereign yield spreads behaviour and, in 
particular, to gauge the effect of changes in market sentiment and risk aversion on yield 
spreads, whose importance has been particularly stressed by the literature since the 
outbreak of the recent debt crisis. However, following the literature that re-emerged with 
the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the paper also examines whether there are differences 
between peripheral and central countries and analyses the time-varying pricing of the same 
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spread drivers by market participants after the onset of the crisis. It thus represents an 
updated analysis of sovereign yield spread drivers in times of crisis.   
 
All in all, looking across the columns in Tables 1 to 6, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: (1) The rise in sovereign risk in central countries in the crisis period can only be 
partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic variables in those countries. 
Conversely, it may be related more to the behaviour of regional macroeconomic 
fundamentals, and also to local, regional and global market sentiment. (2) It is noticeable 
the increase in the significance of the banking level of indebtedness and foreign bank‟s 
claims in the public sector (mainly in peripheral countries) along with the crisis unfolding, 
which highlights the interconnection between private and public debt and thus, between 
banking and sovereign crises. (3) Besides, the variables that measure global market 
sentiment and investors‟ risk aversion, which are significant in both periods, register a rise 
in their marginal effects after the start of the sovereign crisis, particularly in EMU 
peripheral countries. These results confirm the increased importance of investors‟ risk 
aversion suggested by the literature, in times of uncertainty, when “flight-to-safety” motive 
favours bonds of countries that are generally regarded to have a low default risk, and 
consequently implies a risk premium increase in the rest of the countries. (4) In all the 
cases, the marginal effects of sovereign spread drivers increase in the crisis period 
compared to the pre-crisis period, especially in peripheral countries. Therefore, these 
results are in line with previous studies that stress the dynamic properties of sovereign 
spread determinants after the start of the crisis, showing an increase in the sensitivity of the 
price of risk to fundamentals during the euro area debt crisis compared with the pre-crisis 
period. Therefore, our results indicate that the crisis had a significant impact on the 
markets‟ reactions to macroeconomic and financial news, especially so in the peripheral 
countries, giving further support to previous findings by solid econometrics based on a 
comprehensive approach. 
 
We consider that our results will have some practical significance for investors and 
policymakers and will offer some theoretical insights for academic scholars interested in the 
behaviour of euro area sovereign debt markets. Our methodology could be used as a tool 
to provide information regarding the different market prices that investors give to a wide 
set of factors driving EMU sovereign bond yield spreads (particularly those that measure 
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market sentiment) both in periods of stability and in periods of crisis, as well as to examine 
whether there are important differences between central and peripheral countries. 
  
The empirical findings documented in this study could lead to further future research about 
sovereign credit risk, macroeconomic fundamentals, and market sentiment. 
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Figure 1. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2012 
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Table 1. Panel regression: All countries, pre- and crisis analysis with dummies 
 Without dummies With dummies 
Constant  2.9474*  
(3.3173) 
2.9316* 
(2.9636) 
DPRE   -0.1083* 
(-3.3306) 
Local market sentiment 
RAT  0.3371*  
(27.9692) 
0.4903* 
(25.2733) 
DPRE*RAT  -0.1968* 
(-4.5171) 
Regional market sentiment 
EuroIRVIX-1Y  0. 0147* 
(3.4001) 
0. 0157 
(0.5928) 
DPRE*EuroIRVIX-1Y  -0.0012 
(-1.2913) 
EuroIRVIX-10Y  0.0776* 
(3.8115) 
0.0836* 
(4.1129) 
DPRE*EuroIRVIX-10Y  -0.0135* 
(-2.1201) 
Local macrofundamentals 
CAC  -0. 0642* 
(-2.6463) 
-0. 0733* 
(-4.1197) 
DPRE*CAC  0.0106* 
(5.4637) 
DEF 0 .0306* 
(3.1158) 
0 .0451 
(1.3906) 
DPRE*DEF  -0.0183 
(-0.8721) 
LIQ -0..0011* 
(-3.3517) 
-0.0017* 
(-3.1538) 
DPRE*LIQ  0.0004** 
(2.3328) 
BANDEBT 0 0067* 
(5.1629) 
0 0073* 
(5.3906) 
DPRE*BANDEBT  -0.0024* 
(-2.7501) 
Regional macrofundamentals 
EuroGOVDEBT 0. 0799* 
(5.1716) 
0.0836* 
(3.1201) 
DPRE*EuroGOVDEBT  -0.0124* 
(-2.6278) 
Financial linkages 
EXTDEBTPUB 0.1194* 
(14.1451) 
0.1279* 
(5.9066) 
DPRE*EXTDEBTPUB  -0.0211 
(-0.8983) 
R2 0.8246 0.8446 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using White (1980)‟s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the specification 
tests are the associated p-values. *, ** and ***indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
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Table 2. Panel regression: Central countries, pre- and crisis analysis with dummies 
 Without dummies With dummies 
Constant  -2.4938* 
(-13.0438) 
-2.5632* 
(-12.0696) 
DPRE  0.0139* 
(2.8252) 
Local market sentiment 
RAT  0.0270** 
(2.1263) 
0.0447* 
(4.4323) 
DPRE* RAT   -0.0158** 
(-2.5171) 
Regional market sentiment 
EuroEPU  0.0036* 
(6.7169) 
0.0048* 
(5.0857) 
DPRE*EuroEPU   -0.0011* 
(-3.3398) 
EuroCSPREAD  0.0555* 
(13.2188) 
0.0618* 
(6.5218) 
DPRE* EuroCSPREAD   -0.0115*** 
(-.8293) 
Global market sentiment 
GlobalRISK  
 
0 .1758* 
(5.4374) 
0.1928** 
(2.8385) 
DPRE*GlobalRISK  
 
 -0.0650* 
(-2.6443) 
Local macrofundamentals 
GOVDEBT  0.0209* 
(5.5755) 
0.0234* 
(5.4094) 
DPRE*GOVDEBT   -0.0011* 
(-3.9705) 
LIQ  -0.0007* 
(-6.9412) 
-0.0008* 
(-6.2514) 
DPRE*LIQ   0.0003** 
(1.9612) 
Regional macrofundamentals 
EuroGOVDEBT  0.0176* 
(6.6267) 
0.0284* 
(3.1095) 
DPRE* EuroGOVDEBT   -0.0091* 
(-5.2763) 
EuroLIQ  -0.0002* 
(-10.7158) 
-0.0005* 
(-7.4087) 
DPRE* EuroLIQ   0.0002* 
(6.0555) 
Financial linkages 
EXTDEBTPRI 0.0051* 
(10.5303) 
0.0064* 
(4.1345) 
DPRE*EXTDEBTPRI   -0.0008* 
(-3.8016) 
EXTDEBTBAN  0.0127* 
(10.5328) 
0.0143* 
(9.3655) 
DPRE*EXTDEBTBAN   -0.0033* 
(-7.1758) 
R2 0.8071 0.8609 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using White (1980)‟s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the specification 
tests are the associated p-values. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Table 3. Panel regression: Peripheral countries, pre- and crisis analysis with dummies 
 Without dummies With dummies 
Constant  4.1544* 
(8.5911) 
4.2998* 
(8.1812) 
DPRE   -0.1023* 
(-5.5415) 
Local market sentiment 
STOCKV  26.4743** 
(2.3136) 
35.9449* 
(5.6338) 
DPRE*STOCKV   -12.5844* 
(-5.8913) 
IFS  2.8091* 
(5.6425) 
2.9795* 
(5.2706) 
DPRE*IFS   -0.2585* 
(-5.1423) 
Regional market sentiment 
EuroCSPREAD  0.2434* 
(6.7736) 
0.2786* 
(4.9798) 
DPRE* EuroCSPREAD   -0.0342* 
(-3.3927) 
Global market sentiment 
GlobalIFS  0.3252* 
(3.5509) 
0.3705** 
(2.4017) 
DPRE*GlobalIFS   -0.0741* 
(-2.4567) 
Local macrofundamentals 
U  0.3325* 
(8.8743) 
0.3534* 
(4.4835) 
DPRE*U   -0.0399*** 
(-1.7316) 
GOVDEBT  0.2261* 
(22.2359) 
0.2815* 
(17.4315) 
DPRE*GOVDEBT   -0.0613* 
(-10.1341) 
BANDEBT  0.0216* 
(6.1008) 
0.0298*** 
(1.7781) 
DPRE*BANDEBT   -0.0087 
(-0.5462) 
NFCDEBT  0.0469* 
(3.0716) 
0.0549* 
(7.6372) 
DPRE*NFCDEBT   -0.0087* 
(-8.4457) 
Regional macrofundamentals 
EuroGOVDEBT  0.1883* 
(4.8521 
0.2033* 
(4.7515) 
DPRE*EuroGOVDEBT   -0.0216* 
(-4.3156) 
Financial linkages 
EXTDEBTPUB  0.1966* 
(15.8665) 
0.2343*** 
(1.7765) 
DPRE*EXTDEBTPUB   -0.0601* 
(-1.9863) 
EXTDEBTPRI  0.0299* 
(4.5906) 
0.0354* 
(2.9834) 
DPRE*EXTDEBTPRI   -0.0096 
(-0.5314) 
R2 0.8798 0.9145 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using White (1980)‟s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the specification 
tests are the associated p-values. *, ** and ** indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4. Panel regression: All countries, pre- and crisis re-estimation analysis  
 All sample Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
Constant 2.9474*  
(3.3173) 
0.3329 
(0.9823) 
3.6353*  
(4.3749) 
Local market sentiment 
RAT 0.3371*  
(27.9692) 
  
STOCKV  7.3069* 
(3.5833) 
10.1604* 
(2.7909) 
IFS   2.1922* 
(8.1228) 
Regional market sentiment 
EuroCCI   0.4855** 
(2.4135) 
EuroIRVIX-1Y 0. 0147* 
(3.4001) 
 0.4160* 
(4.0323) 
EuroIRVIX-10Y 0.0776* 
(3.8115) 
 1.1245* 
(4.6276) 
EuroCSPREAD   2.9225* 
(4.4721) 
EuroITRAXXFIN   0.0728* 
(4.6106) 
EuroITRAXXNF   0.2970* 
(4.5436) 
EuroDEFAULT  15.9903* 
(9.0031) 
 
EuroSTOCKV  0.0153* 
(5.2026) 
0.7059* 
(3.7908) 
Global market sentiment 
GlobalIFS  0.0153* 
(6.1749) 
5.7669* 
(2.8654) 
Local macrofundamentals 
CAC -0. 0642* 
(-2.6463) 
  
DEF 0 .0306* 
(3.1158) 
0.0572* 
(13.2614) 
0.0661** 
(2.2427) 
GOVDEBT   0.2536* 
(5.4535) 
LIQ -0..0011* 
(-3.3517) 
-0.0085* 
(-3.0849) 
 
BANDEBT 0 0067* 
(5.1629) 
  
HOUDEBT  0.0265* 
(5.1197) 
0.0443* 
(4.4382) 
NFCDEBT   0.1328** 
(2.4782) 
INF  0.1092* 
(5.5294) 
0.4193*** 
(1.9905) 
U  0.0481* 
(3.1414) 
2.2909* 
(11.6623) 
Regional macrofundamentals  
EuroDEF   2.7244* 
(4.0834) 
EuroGOVDEBT 0. 0799* 
(5.1716) 
 0.2535* 
(4.3467) 
Financial linkages 
EXTDEBTPUB 0.1194* 
(14.1451) 
0.0655* 
(7.6197) 
0.1072* 
(3.9608) 
R2 0.8246 0.8466 0.8591 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using White (1980)‟s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the specification 
tests are the associated p-values. *, ** and ***indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5. Panel regression: Central countries, pre- and crisis re-estimation analysis  
 All sample Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
Constant -2.4938* 
(-13.0438) 
-7.1999** 
(2.5963) 
3.5944* 
(8.2816) 
Local market sentiment 
RAT 0.0270** 
(2.1263) 
 0.1054* 
(3.0111) 
IFS  0.4999** 
(2.5071) 
3.1317* 
(11.4726) 
Regional market sentiment 
EuroEPU 0.0036* 
(6.7169) 
 0.0054* 
(5.3616) 
EuroCSPREAD 0.0555* 
(13.2188) 
 0.1547* 
(7.4048) 
EuroIRVIX-1Y  0.0171* 
(2.6841) 
 
EuroIRVIX-10Y  0.0342* 
(3.1638) 
 
EuroITRAXXNF   0.0039* 
(4.2256) 
EuroDEFAULT  13.8892* 
(5.5754) 
 
EuroSTOCKV  0.0094* 
(3.6949) 
 
Global market sentiment 
GlobalRISK 0 .1758* 
(5.4374) 
0.1298* 
(5.1105) 
0 .1462* 
(4.3547) 
Local macrofundamentals 
CAC   -0.0582* 
(-4.1234) 
GOVDEBT 0.0209* 
(5.5755) 
0.0206* 
(4.4667) 
0.0892* 
(11.2212) 
LIQ -0.0007* 
(-6.9412) 
-0.0004* 
(-2.9461) 
-0.0039* 
(-8.1567) 
U   0.1860* 
(3.6269) 
Regional macrofundamentals 
EuroGOVDEBT 0.0176* 
(6.6267) 
0.0148* 
(3.4253) 
0.1105* 
(8.2755) 
EuroLIQ -0.0002* 
(-10.7158) 
-0.0001* 
(-9.8334) 
-0.0004* 
(-8.2735) 
Financial linkages 
EXTDEBTPRI 0.0051* 
(10.5303) 
0.0231* 
(3.7814) 
0.0039* 
(3.3728) 
EXTDEBTBAN 0.0127* 
(10.5328) 
0.0099* 
(6.2242) 
0.0104* 
(4.3216) 
R2 0.8071 0.9456 0.9515 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using White (1980)‟s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the specification 
tests are the associated p-values. *, ** and ***indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6. Panel regression: Peripheral countries, pre- and crisis re-estimation analysis  
 All sample Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
Constant 4.1544* 
(8.5911) 
4.0181* 
(3.8575) 
5.0536* 
(3.7612) 
Local market sentiment 
STOCKV 26.4743** 
(2.3136) 
 80.4863* 
(3.6123) 
IFS 2.8091* 
(5.6425) 
1.7265* 
(8.2369) 
3.8500* 
(7.7512) 
Regional market sentiment 
EuroCSPREAD 0.2434* 
(6.7736) 
0.2157* 
(4.6623) 
0.3979* 
(3.8134) 
EuroDEFAULT  48.0807* 
(4.6402) 
 
Global market sentiment 
GlobalIFS 0.3252* 
(3.5509) 
0.2942* 
(3.8815) 
0.6178* 
(5.0827) 
Local macrofundamentals 
CAC  -0.0892* 
(4.3947) 
 
U 0.3325* 
(8.8743) 
 1.6152* 
(9.3625) 
GOVDEBT 0.2261* 
(22.2359) 
0.0691* 
(9.7908) 
0.3034* 
(70.6739) 
BANDEBT 0.0216* 
(6.1008) 
 0.0361* 
(5.9329) 
NFCDEBT 0.0469* 
(3.0716) 
0.0383* 
(4.9857) 
0.1994* 
(5.2636) 
Regional macrofundamentals 
EuroCAC  -2.4092* 
(-3.3623) 
 
EuroGOVDEBT 0.1883* 
(4.8521)) 
0.1723* 
(2.8677) 
0.1960* 
(3.5105) 
Financial linkages 
EXTDEBTPUB 0.1966* 
(15.8665) 
 0.1158* 
(7.0486) 
EXTDEBTPRI 0.0299* 
(4.5906) 
 0.0133* 
(3.9756) 
EXTBEBTBAN  0.0061* 
(2.6717) 
 
R2 0.8798 0.9602 0.8945 
Notes: FE regression results. In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates are the corresponding z-statistics, 
computed using White (1980)‟s heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. In the square brackets below the specification 
tests are the associated p-values. *, ** and ***indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Appendix A: Definition of the explanatory variables in the panel regressions and 
data sources 
 
A.1. Variables that measure local market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
Stock Returns 
(STOCKR) 
Differences of logged stock index prices of the last and the first 
day of the month for each country. 
Datastream 
Stock Volatility 
(STOCKV) 
Monthly standard deviation of the daily returns of each country‟s 
stock market general index 
 
Datastream 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(Germany, France, Italy, and Spain)/(EPU) 
This index reflects the frequency of newspaper references to 
policy uncertainty and was built by Baker et al., 2013. 
 
www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
 
Index of Fiscal stance 
(IFS) 
 
This indicator compares a target level of the debt-GDP ratio at a 
given point in the future with a forecast based on the government 
budget constraint.  It was built by Polito and Wickens (2011, 
2012). Monthly data have been linearly interpolated from yearly 
observations for the available data: 1999-2011 
 
 
 
Provided by the authors.  
Consumer Confidence Indicator 
(CCI) 
  
This index is built by the European Commission which conducts 
regular harmonised surveys of consumers in each country. 
 
European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
Rating 
(RAT) 
Credit rating scale built from Fitch, Moody‟s, S&P ratings for 
each country.  
 
Bloomberg 
A.2. Variables that measure regional market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
Stock Returns 
(EuroSTOCKR) 
Differences of logged stock indices (Eurostoxx-50) prices of the 
last and the first day of the month for each country. 
 
Yahoo-finance 
Stock Volatility (VSTOXX) 
(EuroSTOCKV) 
Eurostoxx-50 implied stock market volatility index. Monthly 
average of daily data. 
 www.stoxx.com 
 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(Europe)/ (EuroEPU) 
Baker et al., 2013. www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
(Europe)/(EuroIFS)  
Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data have been linearly 
interpolated from yearly observations for the available data: 1999-
2011.  
 
Provided by the authors.  
Consumer Confidence Indicator 
(Eurozone)/(EuroCCI)  
European Commission  European Commission (DG 
ECFIN) 
 
Credit Spread 
(EuroCSPREAD) 
Difference between the yields of the iBoxx indices containing 
BBB-rated European corporate bonds against the yields of the 
respective iBoxx index of AAA-rated European corporate bonds. 
Monthly average of daily data. 
 
 
Datastream 
ITRAXXFIN / ITRAXXNF 
(EuroITRAXXFIN) 
(EuroITRAXXNF) 
European 5-year CDS index in the financial and non-financial 
sectors: 2010:9-2012:12. 
Monthly average of daily data. 
 
Bloomberg 
EIRVIX-1Y/EIRVIX-10Y 
(EuroEIRVIX-1Y) 
(EuroEIRVIX-10Y) 
1-year and 10-year interest rate volatility index for the Eurozone 
based on the implied volatility quotes of caps (floors). This index 
was built by López and Navarro (2013) for the period 2004:1-
2012:4. 
 
 
Provided by the authors. 
 
Euro Instability 
(EuroINSTAB) 
Market expectation of the probability that at least one euro area 
country will have left the currency union at the end of 2013, built 
by Klose and Weigert (2014) for the period 2010:8-2012:8. Monthly 
average of daily data. 
 
 
Provided by the authors. 
Euro area default risk 
(EuroDEFAULT) 
Probability of two or more credit events, calculated by Lucas et. al. 
(2013): 2008:1-2012:12 
 
Provided by the authors. 
A.3. Variables that measure global market sentiment. 
Variable Description Source 
Stock Returns 
(GlobalSTOCKR) 
Differences of logged stock indices (S&P 500) prices of the last 
and the first day of the month. 
 
Datastream 
Stock Volatility (VIX) 
(GlobalSTOCKV) 
Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index. 
(Implied volatility of S&P 500 index options), Monthly average of 
daily data.  
 
Yahoo-Finance 
Index of Economic Policy Uncertainty 
(United States)/(GlobalEPU) 
Baker et al., 2013. www.policyuncertainty.com 
 
Index of the Fiscal stance 
(United States)/(GlobalIFS)  
Polito and Wickens (2011, 2012). Monthly data have been linearly 
interpolated from yearly observations for the available data: 1999-
2011 
 
Provided by the authors.  
 
Global Risk Aversion 
(GlobalRISK) 
The spread between 10-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and 
the yield on 10-year Moody‟s Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds. 
Monthly average of daily data. 
 
Datastream 
 
Kansas City Financial Stress Index 
(GlobalKCFSI) 
Based on 11 financial market variables, each of which captures one 
or more key features of financial stress. Built by Hakkio and 
Keeton (2009) 
 
http://www.kansascityfed.org 
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A.4. Variables that measure local macrofundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position towards  
the rest of the world 
(CAC)  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
OECD 
Growth potential 
(U) 
Unemployment rate  Eurostat 
Competitiveness 
(INF) 
Inflation rate. HICP monthly interannual rate of growth Eurostat  
Fiscal Position 
(DEF) 
(GOVDEBT) 
Government deficit-to-GDP and Government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
(LIQ) 
 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector Amounts Outstanding 
(billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. 
Table 18  
 
 
Bank‟s debt 
(BANDEBT)  
Banks‟ debt-to-GDP.  
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations 
for the GDP. 
ECB‟s Monetary Financial 
Institutions‟ balance sheets and 
own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from 
Eurostat  
 
Non-financial corporation‟s debt 
(NFCDEBT)  
Non-financial corporations‟ debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations 
for the GDP. 
ECB‟s Monetary Financial 
Institutions‟ balance sheets and 
own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from 
Eurostat 
 
Household‟s debt 
(HOUDEBT) 
Households‟ debt-to-GDP of country. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly observations 
for the GDP. 
ECB‟s Monetary Financial 
Institutions‟ balance sheets and 
own estimates. 
GDP has been obtained from 
Eurostat 
A.5. Variables that measure regional macrofundamentals. 
Variable Description Source 
Net position towards  
The rest of the world. 
(EuroCAC)  
Current-account-balance-to-GDP 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
OECD 
Growth potential 
(EuroU) 
Unemployment rate  Eurostat 
Competitiveness 
(EuroINF) 
Inflation rate. HICP monthly interannual rate of growth Eurostat  
Fiscal Position 
(EuroDEF) 
(EuroGOVDEBT) 
Government deficit-to-GDP and Government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
 
Eurostat  
 
Market liquidity 
(EuroLIQ) 
Domestic Debt Securities. Public Sector Amounts Outstanding 
(billions of US dollars) 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
 
BIS Debt securities statistics. 
Table 18  
 
A.6. Variables that measure financial linkages.  
Variable Description Source 
 
Foreign claims on bank‟s debt 
(EXTDEBTBAN) 
Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP.  
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
BIS Consolidated banking 
statistics. Table 9C. GDP has 
been obtained from the 
OECD.  
 
Foreign claims on public‟s  debt 
(EXTDEBTPUB)  
Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations. 
BIS Consolidated banking 
statistics. Table 9C. GDP has 
been obtained from the 
OECD  
Foreign claims on non-financial private‟s debt.  
(EXTDEBTPRI) 
Foreign bank claims on non-financial private debt-to-GDP. 
Monthly data are linearly interpolated from quarterly 
observations.  
BIS Consolidated banking 
statistics. Table 9C. GDP has 
been obtained from the 
OECD.   
Cross-border banking linkages 
(XXYYBAN) 
 
Percentage of the total foreign claims on country XX held by 
country YY's banks  
BIS Consolidated banking 
statistics. Table 9D and own 
estimates. 
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